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Universalism (of values) and particularism (of political communities) are two 
terms which scholars have struggled for long time to tame into a dialectical relation-
ship (Bader 1997: 773). More often than not, however, these two dimensions, which 
historically have legitimated the existence of civic nation-states, have caused uneasi-
ness among intellectuals. How is indeed possible to confine a political community 
when its source of legitimacy is rooted not in the specifics of an ethnos, but in the ap-
peal to universal values? The question is particularly relevant today, i.e. in an epoch 
in which, under the pressure of financial, communication, and migration flows, the 
isomorphism between sovereignty, territory, and identity seems to have become un-
tenable ( Soysal, 1994; Appadurai 1996; Habermas, 1998; 2001a). Going beyond this 
isomorphism, the postnational discourse affirms indeed the divorce of the state from 
the nation or, to use the terminology that Smith (1995: 11) refers to Hobsbawm, the 
‘de-politicization’ of the nation. This means that the space that once saw the coinci-
dence between the political (state) and the cultural (nation) has to be re-thought, from 
a unitary space to a plural and fragmented socio-spatial constellation – the ‘postna-
tional constellation’, as indeed Habermas (2001a) calls it. This postnational condition 
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has fed (and it has been fed by) the re-conceptualization of the notion of citizenship. 
In her seminal work, Soysal (1994) has shown the increasing decoupling of rights and 
identity, as citizenship is increasingly decoupled from belonging to the national com-
munity. In Western Europe’s multicultural societies, citizenship is no longer a cultur-
al, but only a political dimension. In other words, it is no longer national belonging 
which constitutes the source of rights and duties, but human rights, which are legiti-
mated at the transnational level. Thus, for instance, as Soysal (2002: 140) recalls 
when Pakistani immigrants in Britain demand the teaching of Islam in state schools, 
they appeal to the principle of human rights and, consequently, it is not surprising that 
they activate the European Court of Human Rights on this issue.  
This postnational thesis can be discarded as merely ‘unrealistic’, as Schnapper 
(2002: 10), for instance, suggested from the pages of this journal. She argued that na-
tional identity and political allegiance have always gone together in the history of lib-
eralism and therefore there is no reason to think that the future will be different. Yet, 
to discard a hypothesis by referring to evidence that comes from the past or by adduc-
ing, in a slightly essentialist tone, the emotional nature of human beings does not real-
ly help us to understand and answer the demand of inclusion associated with multicul-
tural societies. If the statistical projection of the United Nations is true, by 2050, over 
60% of the total populations of France, Germany, and Italy will be descendants of 
non-native born persons (United Nations 2000 quoted in Berezin 2003: 27). In this 
context, how is it possible to reproduce an ethno-cultural idea of the nation? Even if 
everybody is going to assimilate, it would be naïve to think that this process would 
not change the terms highlighted by Smith in his answer to the question ‘when is a 
nation?’ (Smith 2002). 
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Ipperciel, among others, has not dismissed the postnational hypothesis as unrealis-
tic, but, as a way to solve the original conundrum (how to reconcile universalism and 
particularism), he has taken seriously Habermas’ theory – one of the most sophisticat-
ed intellectual efforts to reflect on the transformation of the nation-state in the age of 
globalization. Yet, despite Ipperciel’s willingness to remain within the postnational 
terrain, his argument reveals some theoretical and pragmatic shortcomings when ana-
lyzed from this postnational perspective. In fact, theoretically, it seems to me that his 
reasoning ends up bringing the postnational back to a national dimension and, prag-
matically, it leaves unanswered some questions about the actual feasibility of his hy-
pothesis in today’s multicultural world. 
As it is well known, in his theory about ‘constitutional patriotism’, Habermas ad-
vocates a form of deliberative democracy which is not legitimated by the existence of 
an ethnos, ‘a people’ in ethno-cultural terms, but by a demos, a collectivity shaped by 
the same political culture. Put it differently, for Habermas cultural homogeneity is not 
a necessary condition for democracy, as engagement into the public sphere is what 
produce the collective opinion- and will-formation which secures legitimacy of and 
support to political institutions. 
Ipperciel, however, notes that Habermas’ reasoning leaves unanswered an im-
portant question: ‘how are the democratic state’s borders to be set?’ (Ipperciel 2007: 
400). Ipperciel’s question does not focus on the lack of a common ‘thick’ cultural 
identity, which Schnapper and other communitarian authors (Miller 1995) have used 
to reject as unrealistic Habermas’ model of constitutional patriotism. His question, 
instead, aims to give an answer to the seemingly irreconcilable relationship between 
universalism (the functioning of procedural democracy) and particularism (the neces-
sity of drawing a geographical boundary around this democracy). Given the fact that 
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Habermas is unable to answer this question (Ipperciel 2007: 400), Ipperciel, following 
‘a Habermasian logic beyond Habermas himself’ (Ipperciel 2007: 398), essays to of-
fer such an answer. The lack of a conspicuous reflection on this issue by postnational 
authors can be perhaps explained by the fact that these authors, following the post-
Westphalian argument ( Ruggie 1993; Anderson 1996; Albert et al. 2001), maintain 
that, in the present epoch, the modern distinction between inside-inclusion (domestic) 
and outside-exclusion (international) no longer holds, as boundaries have become in-
creasingly porous, fuzzy, blurred, and in a permanent flux (Neumann 1998; Newman 
and Paasi 1998; Newman 2001; Zielonka 2002). Not surprisingly, Habermas, whose 
constitutional patriotism ultimately translates into a form of cosmopolitanism, has not 
given particular attention to the issue of boundaries. In practice, however, if we are 
not to believe, with Wendt (2003), that a world state is inevitable, then we should 
come to terms with the fact that, even in the age of globalization, societies remain 
separated into different political communities. This basic fact informs today also 
mainstream cosmopolitan theories, as Beck and Grande (2007), for instance, have re-
cently argued against a cosmopolitanism tied to the ‘cosmos’ and have privileged in-
stead a ‘cosmopolitan realism’, i.e. an ethical approach aimed at pursuing one’s own 
interests in the respect of others’ interests. Ipperciel’s question, therefore, even though 
not a privileged one by postnational authors, is definitely relevant. Yet, his answer 
seems to me rather problematic. In his search for the rationale which can be used to 
define the boundaries of contemporary postnational democratic societies, Ipperciel 
points indeed to the importance of language: ‘common language is a sine qua non of 
public discussion’ (Ipperciel 2007: 400). Public discussion is, following Habermas, 
the essential criterion for developing a political culture on which constitutional patri-
otism is based, ergo commonality of language is they key principle for drawing the 
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boundaries of the democratic state. Logically, the reasoning is consistent. Theoretical-
ly, however, it brings Habermas’ postnational dimension back into a national one. As 
it is well known, language is one of the criteria traditionally used by students of na-
tionalism to trace the boundaries of the nation (Gellner 1983; Smith 1995). Ipperciel 
(2007: 401) explicitly mentions that his use of the notion of language is not a Herderi-
an one – language as a depositary of culture, tradition, history, etc. – but a functional 
one – language as a medium of communication. Yet, Ipperciel also admits that to sep-
arate the two dimensions is impossible, as language as a function ‘does not in any way 
invalidate its cultural aspect as bearer of tradition’ (Ipperciel 2007: 401) – a point that 
clearly emerges from Ipperciel’s account of eighteenth century France. It is precisely 
because of this intrinsic symbolic character that Habermas has discarded any notion of 
commonality of language in his postnational model: “[…] a political culture in the 
seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on 
all citizens sharing the same language […]” (Habermas 1992: 7). Referring specifical-
ly to Europe as a would-be postnational society, Habermas has reiterated this point, 
by expressly rejecting the formation of a monolingual (English-speaking) public 
sphere, which would be constituted only by a business elite, and he has favored, in-
stead, the persistence of national public spheres and the use of translation,  which 
would guarantee a larger democratic participation (Habermas 2001b: 18-19). I am not 
therefore sure whether Ipperciel’s reasoning can really consider itself ‘to follow a Ha-
bermasian logic beyond Habermas himself’ (Ipperciel 2007: 398). 
These last considerations bring me to the pragmatic shortcomings which I see in 
Ipperciel’s thesis. As a way to test his hypothesis, Ipperciel briefly analyzes the cases 
of what, as he says, are the ‘four multilingual nation-states among all the Western 
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countries’ - namely, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Canada.1 Contrary to Miller’s 
(2001) interpretation of sub-state nations as ‘nested nationalities’, Ipperciel affirms 
that ‘multilingualism is not an attribute of the nation, but of the state’ (Ipperciel 2007: 
407) and all the four case-studies confirm, according to Ipperciel, that language is 
what sets each public sphere apart from another. In a linear, causal scheme this would 
read as follows: one language => one public sphere => one (civic) nation. Strangely 
enough, though, this scheme undermines the fact that, for instance, in Catalonia-, par-
ticipation to the public sphere can also take place in Spanish, rather than in Catalan or, 
in the case of the Italian region of Valle d’Aosta-Vallée d’Aoste, the process of opin-
ion- and will-formation takes place both in Italian and in French. Moreover, if we 
have to espouse Ipperciel’s thesis, it would be difficult to explain why, for instance, 
Scotland, despite being overwhelmingly English-speaking, is today again on its way 
to ask for independence. Similarly, it would be simply impossible to think of any fu-
ture European political integration, given the lack of a medium of communication 
which is mastered by all its citizens. More importantly, however, I think that the lim-
its of Ipperciel’s thesis emerge in relation not to multinational states – as he argues -, 
but to multicultural societies, which I think generate today the most urgent questions 
about inclusion/exclusion. While multinational states are formed by national commu-
nities which generally claim a specific portion of the state’s territory as their home-
land, multicultural societies are formed by immigrant communities whose homeland 
is somewhere else, outside the boundary of the state where they live. This often means 
that these immigrant communities are scattered all over the territory of the state. Cul-
                                                 
1 As a geographer, I guess I should point out that the Western democratic countries where ‘more than 
one official or public language is recognised within the state’ (Ipperciel 2007: 407) are actually much 
more than four. If we focus only on Europe, these countries are Italy (Italian, French, German, and La-
din), Portugal (Portuguese and Mirandese), Finland (Finnish and Swedish), Ireland (English and Gael-
ic), Austria (German, Croatian, Hungarian and Slovene), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian, Croa-
tian, and Serbian). 
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tural-linguistic boundaries run confusingly inside the territory of the state and make 
impracticable any attempt to use language as a criterion (albeit only ‘political’, as 
stressed by Ipperciel) to draw the geographic boundary of the political community. 
How is it indeed possible to draw a boundary around something which is spatially 
fragmented? Multicultural societies defy the idea, invented by late eighteen century 
France, of a cultural-linguistic boundary which must run along the boundary of the 
state. The boundary of the nation and the boundary of the state today no longer match 
– if they have ever matched in the past either. 
In an epoch in which societies become even more multilingual, as several lan-
guages coexist in the same place and at the same time, a common language as a medi-
um of inter-individual communication is needed, but to use it as a criterion for bind-
ing social spaces can generate unreflexive undemocratic effects. In fact, this choice 
risks reinforcing the condition of exclusion of some of those immigrants who do not 
(yet) master the language of the dominant culture in which they are immersed. Rather 
than creating an environment of inclusion, as in the original spirit of Habermas’ post-
national model, the choice of a common language as a criterion for drawing the 
boundaries of the democratic space would reproduce and reify social marginalization 
and exclusion, at least for some first generation immigrants. I am not criticizing the 
necessity to have a common medium of communication. I am only questioning both 
the feasibility and the democratic nature of language as the principle of inclu-
sion/exclusion in multicultural societies.  
To conclude, does this means that we have to live with the irreconcilability of 
universalism and particularism, as we lack a principle which can be used to set a geo-
graphic boundary around a democratic space? I think that this conundrum can be 
loosely solved by reading Habermas himself and other authors too. In the introduction 
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to The Postnational Constellation, Max Pensky (2001) pointed out that in Habermas, 
universalism, as a moral and political principle, ‘can only be plausibly realized 
through the very particular history, traditions, and forms of life that continue to char-
acterize national cultures’ (Pensky 2001: xii - see also Fine and Smith 2003: 471). 
Similarly, espousing Rawls’ liberal contractualist position, Andreas Føllesdal (2000) 
has argued that although societies are regulated by the sense of justice of individuals 
who comply with rules which emanate from just institutions and which apply to them, 
the origin of societies can only rely on a shared history. These comments suggest that 
it is always historical the dimension for which societies become bound. No single fac-
tor accounts for the process of boundary-making, as this is the product of an ensemble 
of different practices which accumulate in the course of history: different modes of 
production, different wars (which create spaces of inclusion/exclusion in a Schmittean 
sense), and different relations of affiliation, identification, agon, and estrangement, as 
in Isin’s (2002) forms of being political. To reduce ad unum (i.e. language) the prin-
ciple which can justify the bounding of political communities would fail to take into 
account the living complexity of societies or, in Calhoun’s words, ‘the richer ways of 
constituting life together’ (Calhoun 2002: 151). 
 9
References 
 
Albert, Mathias et al. (eds.). 2001. Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking Interna-
tional Relations Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Anderson, James.1996. 'The shifting stage of politics: New medieval and postmodern 
territorialities?' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 14: 133-153. 
Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. 'Sovereignty without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational 
Geography,' in Patricia Yaeger (ed.), The Geography of Identity. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press. 
Bader, Veit. 1997. 'The cultural conditions of transnational citizenship: On the inter-
penetration of political and ethnic cultures', Political Theory 25: 771-813. 
Beck, Ulrich and Grande, Edgar. 2007. 'Cosmopolitanism. Europe's way out of crisis', 
European Journal of Social Theory 10(1): 67-85. 
Berezin, Mabel. 2003. 'Introduction: Territory, Emotion, and Identity: Spatial Recali-
bration in a New Europe', in Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain (eds.), Europe 
without Borders : Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Trans-
national Age. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Calhoun, Craig. 2002. 'Imagining solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, constitutional patriot-
ism, and the public sphere', Public Culture 14(1): 147-171. 
Fine, Robert and Smith, Will. 2003. 'Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism', 
Constellations 10(4): 469-487. 
Føllesdal, Andreas. 2000. 'The future soul of Europe: Nationalism or just patriotism? 
A critique of David Miller's defence of nationality', Journal of Peace Re-
search, 37(4):503-518. 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 10
Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. 'Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the 
future of Europe', Praxis International 12(1): 1-19. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1998. The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 2001a. The Postnational Constellation: Political essays, Cam-
bridge: MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 2001b. 'Why Europe needs a constitution,' New Left Review 11: 5-
26. 
Ipperciel, Donald. 2007. 'Constitutional democracy and civic nationalism,' Nations 
and Nationalism 13(3): 395-416. 
Isin, Engin F. 2002. 'Ways of being political', Distinktion 4: 7-28.  
Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Neumann, Iver B. 1998. 'European identity, EU expansion, and the integra-
tion/exclusion nexus', Alternatives 23(3): 397-416. 
Newman, David. 2001. 'Boundaries, Borders, and Barriers: Changing Geographic 
Perspectives on Territorial Lines', in Mathias Albert et al. (eds.), Identities, 
Borders, Orders. Rethinking International Relations Theory. Minnepaolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Newman, David and Paasi, Anssi. 1998. 'Fences and neighbours in the postmodern 
world: boundary narratives in political geography', Progress in Human Geog-
raphy, 22(2): 186-207. 
Pensky, Max. 2001. 'Editor's Introduction', in Jürgen Habermas (ed.) The Postnational 
Constellation. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Ruggie, John Gerard 1993. 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations', International Organization 47(1): 139-174. 
 11
Schnapper, Dominique. 2002. 'Citizenship and national identity in Europe', Nations 
and Nationalism 8(1): 1-14. 
Smith, Anthony D. 1995. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Cambridge: Poli-
ty Press. 
Smith, Anthony D. 2002. 'When is a nation?' Geopolitics 7(2): 5-32. 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu. 2002. 'Citizenship and Identity: Living Diasporas in Post-
war Europe?', in Ulf Hedetoft and Mette Hjort (eds.), The Postnational Self. 
Belonging and Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Wendt, Alexander. 2003. 'Why a world state is inevitable', European Journal of In-
ternational Relations 9(4): 491-542. 
Zielonka, Jan. 2002. Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of 
the European Union. London: Routledge. 
 
 
